reducing "Crew-caused"
approach and landing

Pilot-in-charge Monitored Approach

Day-to-day risk as perceived by line pilots.

To reduce the accident rate to the target by changing individual crew member attitudes through generalised CRM training, it would be necessary to improve crew member "quality" overall by nearly an order of magnitude.   But most crews already operate in what they believe to be a very safe manner - most airline pilots would rate their work as being considerably safer than many other aspects of their lives such as driving to the airport. It is certainly safer than most other types of aviation. 

It's unlikely in fact that most pilots actually accept they need to be change their attitudes and be made several times safer by CRM training. Let's look at some ball-park ("rough, order-of-magnitude") numbers.
  • A pilot flying a 35 year career with a high efficiency short-haul airline, operating 1000 hours per annum on 1 hour sectors, would fly 35,000 flights in his entire career.
  • A pilot with a short (say 15 year) career with an inefficient, ultra-long haul airline, flying 700 hours a year on 14 hour average sectors would fly 750 flights in his entire career.
  • Within these extremes, a typical pilot might be taken as having a 10,000 to 15,000 flight career exposure.
  • The global accident rate is broadly 1 accident per million flights.
  • It is generally accepted that for every accident there are a number of serious incidents and a larger number of less serious events.  
  • If each accident is associated with 20 serious incidents, and each serious incident with 50 minor ones, there would be 1000 minor events per accident, or one per 1000 flights.

The typical pilot in a two-crew environment might therefore see 20 or so such events in his career, and at realistic actual exposure rates, this could actually be between say one or two a year to one a decade.  Most of these are of course relatively minor events from all causes, the vast majority of which would not only NOT be "crew caused", but in fact are events due to other causes which the crew had successfully PREVENTED from becoming more serious events. 

Just to validate these broad numbers, one major airline with a highly sophisticated air safety incident reporting and analysis system receives approximately one to two event reports (for all causes), per pilot, per year. Approximately one in twenty of these is classified as being of significant risk.
Given the very low risk most pilots are actually exposed to, it's extremely improbable that we will be able to convince every individual pilot that he or she needs personally to be ten times safer in future than they are today - let alone actually to make them so.
Most pilots rarely experience significant incidents, and those that they do experience are not generally crew-originated. Indeed, most incidents involve the crew members fulfil their responsibilities perfectly well in preventing errors originating elsewhere from becoming accidents. 
So whilst most pilots probably do accept the broad intentions of, and benefit from, CRM training, it is certainly questionable whether the sort of broad-brush approach being taken can ever eliminate the rare individual cases where things go seriously wrong.