reducing "Crew-caused"
approach and landing

Pilot-in-charge Monitored Approach

Stressed to the limit.

Over and above these characteristics inherent to the individuals, the situation itself can degrade their ability to make a sound judgement.  For example, for the PF in particular, high workload may cause him to concentrate too much on one aspect of a problem at the expense of others ("tunnel vision"). He or she may become susceptible to "confirmation bias" and loss of situational awareness. This in itself will INCREASE the CCAG if the PF becomes more convinced that he is right, and less receptive to contrary input from the PM.

Stress will rise sharply (for the PM in particular) if one or other is concerned about imminent life-threatening aspects of the situation.  All of these elements go into  the judgement of each individual as to whether the situation is "dangerous", and when to do something about it. This is particularly true when the PF is simultaneously calling for the PM to carry out actions which the PM himself believes will make the situation worse (configuration changes etc).

In one of the recent cases quoted at the start of this section, colleagues of the deceased First Officer were asked how, as PNF, they would initiate a go-around when unstable below 1000 feet. Responses varied, some saying they would call out "Unstable approach, go-around", and one pilot indicating that, as a last resort, he would take control and fly the go-around himself.

However even in the static and relatively stress-free setting of an interview, some pilots took up to 90 seconds to respond, indicating the difficult situation in which the First Officer is placed.