The report noted the extreme authority gradient in which the 58 year old male Captain had over 18500 hours total and 9600 on type, while the 25 year old female F/O had 600 hours total and 15 hours on type.  

The Captain did not conduct any briefing for the approach, which was conducted in a strong crosswind with winds of 22 gusting 37 knots. Because of the wind, the Captain elected to make tha approach at a significantly higher speed than recommended  (132 kt vs. 118 kts). The gusts were in excess of the crosswind limit for the aircraft.  Subsequently the aircraft touched down nose-wheel first (pitch -2.6 degrees) and bounced.

Just before the first bounce the F/O also started making inputs to the controls. Some were in opposite directions to the Captain's, causing them to disconnect. After the first contact with the runway, the aircraft made three successive touchdowns, in the course of first the nose-gear and then the main landing gear failed, causing the engines to stop. The aircraft slid around an additional 400 m to its eventual stopping place.

The report notes that the Captain did not conduct any briefing so there was no common appreciation of the factors taht would affect the landing such as the limiting cross wind. "The conviction of the commander (PF) resulting from his considerable experience both generally and specifically of the aircraft type in question, that he was able to conduct a safe landing despite the presence of wind conditions critical for the type of aircraft. [The] considerable gap in experience between the captain and first officer, [which] inhibited her from expressing any criticism or comment, thus rendering ineffective the CRM techniques." 

If the SOP had been a PicMA procedure, the Captain would probably have taken control fairly early on. However:    

1) There would have had to be a briefing and hence some discussion of approach speeds. Even if the Captain had insisted on a higher one than technically appropriate, there would probably have been some conservatism injected into both pilots' thinking. 

2) During the approach the Captain would have been in direct communication with ATC to receive and evaluate the wind factors.