At about the time the autopilot was disengaged, the crosswind from the left increased as well as the rain. The flight path angle reduced as the aircraft approached the theshold, lengthening the subsequent landing. The F/O said he could still see the runway throughout, noticed that the aircraft was drifting of the centreline and twice called "fly left". The report noted that the large difference in weather information (especially wind velocity) between that received by the crew and that actually encountered. 

The Captain was very experienced, the F/O relatively low experience. During simulations, most of the company's other pilots could not achieve a normal landing on the runway in similar conditions, notably the loss of visual reference.

The report concluded that the crew should have gone around from the flare as the approach had became unstabilised at very low altitude.   

In this event the potential for reduced risk from the use of PicMA is likely to be small, as the Captain would still have been PF at that point, and exposed to the same conditions. Realistically, the event would probably have occurred anyway. However 

1) If the First Officer had been monitoring the instruments more closely to touchdown, he might have detected the lateral and vertical deviations sooner and alerted the Captain prior to the encounter with the rain and subsequent loss of visual reference. 

2) While the F/O did alert the Captain to the divergence, but did not actually call for a go-around. He might have been more assertive if he had had a more active role as PF during the earlier part of the approach, but this is very speculative and not particularly likely given the authority gradient in the cockpit and the very limited time available to react.