



Go-Arounds

Background:

Ten percent of accidents between 2009 and 2013 cited an unstable approach as a factor. A graph of the percentage of accidents with unstable approaches as a factor over the last five years is included below.



The ACTF noted a correlation between unstable approaches and accidents due to crews not performing a go-around when required. The graph of the previous five years percentage of accidents where it was noted that the crew continued to land following an unstable approach as a factor is included above.

Discussion:

The go-around procedure is rarely flown and is a challenging maneuver. Crews must be sufficiently familiar with flying go-arounds through initial and recurrent training.

Somatogravic head-up illusions during the unfamiliar forward acceleration in a go-around can lead to the incorrect perception by the flight crew that the nose of the aircraft is pitching up. This illusion can cause pilots to respond with an inappropriate nose down input on the flight controls during the execution of a go-around. Such responses have led to periodic accidents.

There are also cases when the crew engage the autopilot to reduce the workload, but instead put the aircraft in an undesired situation due to a lack of situational awareness with the automation.

Airlines should not limit training scenarios to the initiation of a go-around at the approach minimum or missed approach point. Training scenarios should focus on current operational threats as well as traditional situations.